Articles 3 to 8 of the draft Law on Urban Development are regarded as the legislation’s “institutional core,” laying the foundation for transforming urban administrations from entities primarily responsible for implementation and compliance into proactive policymakers and drivers of development.
Speaking to Sai Gon Giai Phong Newspaper reporters, Dr. Nguyen Thi Thien Tri, a lecturer at the Ho Chi Minh City University of Law, said the draft’s key breakthrough lies in decentralizing powers in tandem with accountability, creating greater room for special cities to proactively address practical issues that existing laws have yet to keep pace with.
According to Dr. Nguyen Thi Thien Tri, the provisions in Articles 3 to 8 of the draft Law on Urban Development are general principles that provide direction for the law’s specific mechanisms and policies. For the Law on Urban Development, these provisions must embody a stronger and more progressive approach than the general regulations governing local government organization, empowering cities to proactively shape and drive their own development.
A notable shift in legislative thinking is the use of “special urban governance relations” as the basis for designing decentralization mechanisms. Special cities have population sizes, development rates, and governance requirements that differ from those of ordinary localities. Applying a uniform framework would make it difficult for urban administrations to respond promptly to rapidly emerging and highly specific challenges.
The draft law reflects a shift from an urban administration model focused primarily on implementation and compliance to one that proactively makes decisions and formulates policies within its assigned authority. Accordingly, the relationship between the central and local governments should feature a clearer division of responsibilities: “The local government holds the oars, while the central government steers the boat.”
To assess the extent of the breakthrough, it is first necessary to correctly identify the existing legal bottlenecks.
The first bottleneck is that while laws have already provided relevant regulations, implementing decrees and circulars have not been issued in a timely manner, remain incomplete, or are not aligned with the requirements of urban governance. Local authorities can clearly identify the problems but lack sufficient authority to address them.
The second bottleneck is that new issues have emerged in urban development that are not yet covered by laws or National Assembly resolutions, or existing regulations are no longer appropriate. If local authorities have to wait for the entire central-level legislative process to be completed, development opportunities could be missed, while problems involving transport, the environment, investment, housing, healthcare, and education continue to accumulate.
The draft Law on Urban Development proposes two corresponding groups of solutions: allowing cities, within the scope and conditions prescribed by law, to issue regulations that differ from certain central-level legal documents; and piloting new policies to address issues not yet covered by laws or National Assembly resolutions.
Compared with the uniform management approach and previous models for piloting special mechanisms, this represents a significant step forward.
Additionally, the delegation of powers must always go hand in hand with power control and accountability. However, clear and transparent delineation of powers is itself an effective means of exercising control.
The guiding principle should be "Where the power lies, so does the responsibility.” When the law clearly specifies which agency has decision-making authority and the scope of that authority and the corresponding responsibilities, inspection, oversight, and accountability measures can be carried out more effectively.
Urban administrations are also subject to multiple existing oversight mechanisms, including supervision by the same-level People’s Councils, inspections by higher-level authorities, reporting and accountability requirements, the settlement of complaints and denunciations, administrative adjudication, Party inspections, and oversight by the Vietnam Fatherland Front, socio-political organizations, citizens, and the press.
A notable feature of the draft is not necessarily the creation of an entirely new oversight mechanism, but rather the establishment of checks and balances through the very way decision-making powers and responsibilities are delineated.
Socializing certain support activities in the delivery of public services is a trend in line with efforts to streamline the state apparatus and improve the quality of public services.
To prevent unequal access to services or their excessive commercialization, activities to be outsourced to non-state entities should be carefully selected, while state agencies should retain decision-making stages in administrative procedures. At the same time, robust oversight mechanisms should be put in place to prevent violations.
The selection of participating businesses and organizations should also be conducted openly and transparently, with professional capacity, service quality, and data protection capabilities serving as key criteria. Strict controls should be imposed on conflicts of interest to prevent favoritism, “insider” arrangements, and backdoor dealings, as well as the misuse of administrative procedures for commercial gain or to impose additional costs on citizens.
